



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

real, and hence if I follow the path of self-interest I shall be doing my duty by you'? Or shall one rather say, 'The conflict cannot be real, and hence if I seek your good I shall at the same time be subserving my own highest interests'? It is clear that to show that there is no real conflict is not to tell us how we ought to act in the face of an apparent one. Professor Fite says that in all such cases we should be guided by the principle of self-interest. But is this obvious? The apparent conflict of interests is due, we are told, to the fact that we are only imperfectly conscious. Now if this is so, is it not at least possible that the 'voice of duty,' as we call it, or the stirrings of sympathy may be a safer guide than the promptings of self-interest? It may be that if my self-interest were fully enlightened, it would never lead me to work injury to another. But it does not follow that for the partially developed consciousness the promptings of an imperfectly enlightened self-interest will be the safest moral guide. With the author's protest against the sentimental or the hypocritical eulogizing of self-sacrifice I heartily agree: exhorting men to do what they cannot do or what the exhorter himself never does is not particularly useful. But on the other hand it seems to me that Professor Fite fails to do complete justice to an important fact of modern life, the fact, namely, that in the present state of human society 'my duty' or 'my own highest interest' sometimes presents itself to me in the guise of the interest of another. I do not mean that he wholly overlooks this fact. And I am not unmindful of the high plane of thought in which his whole argument moves. But it seems to me that in his revolt against the sentimental eulogizing of self-sacrifice and 'brotherly love' he has failed to emphasize sufficiently the importance, for the moral life, of human sympathy and of that aspect of men's experience which we call 'the conflict between duty and self-interest.'

ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.

MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE.

Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft. Von JOHANNES REHMKE. Leipzig, Kesselerische Buchhandlung, 1910.—Pp. vii, 706.

Philosophy, the author tells us in the preface, has been "ein buntes bewegtes Bild" (p. iii) of world-views, none of which have gained general acceptance. One might then either adopt the Fichtean position, and regard philosophy as the expression of one's own personality, or he might try to be content with the study of the history of philosophy. Yet neither of these courses would satisfy our natural craving for a *Philosophie als Wissenschaft*. Difficult to attain as this will always be, we must continue to seek it with all our powers. Professor

Rehmke accordingly, with that unabated courage which marks the lover of philosophy, has made a fresh effort in this direction; and we have now one more system to add to the long list. Yet it is not a system in the bad sense of closing forever certain lines of inquiry, but rather in the sense of starting from a clear point of view and aiming at objective demonstrable certainty. The knowledge which the author seeks will not be phenomenistic, but will hold of things as they are, and it will have the "Bodenständigkeit" (p. iv) of the *Fachwissenschaften*, i. e., will be such that "der Gegenstand *aus sich selbst* seine Erklärung findet" (p. iv). At the same time it is, as we shall see, a thorough, almost radical, empiricism.

The book is divided into three parts, "Grundlegender," "Kritischer," and "Abschliessender"; treating respectively of philosophy as the one fundamental science, of epistemology as no true part of philosophy, if indeed worthy of study at all, and of certain metaphysical doctrines resulting from the first part. By far the greatest interest lies in this first part; it is the positive, constructive portion, and occupies nearly two-thirds of the book (pp. 1-430). It is worked out with real minuteness, and on account of its novelty we shall expound it in some detail. What is knowledge? Simply that which satisfies our instinctive desire for unquestioned and perfectly clear certainty about the given. *Wissenschaft* then is "das Unternehmen das Gegebene fraglos zu bestimmen, und Erkenntnis heisst das fraglos bestimmte Gegebene" (p. 15). Since this "given" is necessarily given to consciousness, the term "Bewusstseinsbesitz" is often used to denote it; that term is preferable to "Bewusstseinsinhalt" because it does not connote psychical characters. ". . . fordere ich den Leser auf, in dieses Wort nichts mehr hinein zulegen, als was hier gesagt ist: Bewusstseinsbesitz als Gegenstand der Wissenschaft oder der Erkenntnis" (p. 15). Further, we are warned not to confuse "given" with "real": "given" is the widest possible term. ". . . nicht nur das 'Wirkliche' ist Gegebenes, sondern zu diesem gehört in gleicher Weise das 'Nicht wirkliche,' weil auch dieses zum Bewusstseinsbesitz gehört" (p. 15). While then the not-real has a certain respectable status, the not-given is pure *nichts*. To speak of something beyond the given which we cannot know is to speak of nothing at all: if there are limits of knowledge it must be within the given. "'Unerkennbares,' das nicht 'Gegebenes' sein soll, ist ein sinnloses Wort" (p. 17). There may indeed be objects given to some one not myself, or to some past experience of my own which I cannot repeat; and really Spencer's "Unknowable" is conceived in this wise (p. 23).

Knowable means only "Gegebenes, das *schlechthin fraglos* bestimmt werden kann" (p. 19). Accordingly all the given is within the pale of the knowable. "So steht das Wort des Grenzers von den Grenzen menschlichen Erkennens als leeres Wort da" (p. 27).

After two sections of these preliminary definitions, we come in the third section to the more particular study of the given. "All that is given is particular, without exception (p. 34); even universals (which are given) are particular in that they differ from one another. Since now the given comprises universals and individuals, there will be two groups of sciences, the "Allgemeinwissenschaften" and the "Geschichtswissenschaften." These study respectively certain given universals and certain groups of given individuals. The former include mathematics, physics, logic, ethics, physiology, psychology, chemistry, philology, biology; the latter include all historical sciences (p. 38). The given, in accordance with what was said above, here includes the not-real as well as the real—viz. in the case of mathematics which studies the given and ideal. Now in the universal group we find a distinction. Some universals are of widest application, some of less wide. The widest comprise the object-matter of the universal sciences when considered absolutely or as such. "So hat die Mathematik zum Beispiel mit der besonderen Räumen und Zahlen zu tun, sie fragt aber nicht, was deren Allgemeinstes, "Raum schlechtweg" und was "Zahl schlechtweg" sei; und die Physik, deren besonderer Grund besondere Veränderungen des Dinges sind, fragt . . . nicht was dessen Allgemeinstes, also was "Veränderung schlechtweg" und was "Ding schlechtweg" sei; und die Psychologie . . . was "Seelisches schlechtweg" sei (p. 39). There is then need of a particular discipline "in dem wir das Allgemeinstes des Begebenen überhaupt zum besonderen Gegenstand machen und schlechthin fraglos zubestimmen suchen" (p. 39). This is "Grundwissenschaft" or philosophy. The author's definition here seems to the reviewer akin to the concept of "Gegenstandstheorie," although in the absence of bibliographical references it is difficult to be certain. Professor Rehmke's use of the terms "space absolutely," "thing absolutely," etc., and his use of "given" as indifferent to actuality, point in this direction.

Has philosophy any presuppositions? Every special science is in its own field quite empirical, though presupposing the concept of its subject-matter. All such concepts it is the business of philosophy to study and "fraglos zu bestimmen." Philosophy however does not deduce them, for it presupposes no axioms, but only "setzt zwar Gegebenes voraus, dieses aber als völlig unbestimmtes Gegebenes, sie

setzt also *nur Gegebenes schlechtweg* voraus" (p. 47). Even logic, universal as it is, assumes as subject-matter the judgment (p. 83) and is therefore not *Grundwissenschaft*. Now as to the content of philosophy: the principal, because most universal, category is that of *thing*. The problem is "was das 'Ding schlechtweg' als besonderes Gegebenes sei, um. . . . Allgemeinste schlechtlein fraglos zu bestimmen" (p. 88). The thing as given is found to consist, first, of a "Dingaugenblick" or momentary object. We now see that the author is referring solely to physical things (or concepts of them), for he designates as the three necessary and sufficient conditions of a "Dingaugenblick" quantity, form, and place (*Ort*). He gives no *rationale* of these three; they seem to be just so given. He insists strongly on the importance of place to a thing. It is here treated as absolute and distinguished from *Lage* or relative situation in that the *Lage* presupposes *Ort*, but not conversely (pp. 104, 105). At this point a discussion of the nature of contradiction is brought in, suggested by the topic of *place* and motion. The author takes an empirical view of it—viz., that whatever is given cannot be contradictory—akin to that of James, Paulhan and others, and opposed to the general rationalistic doctrine. No names are mentioned here, and in the opinion of the reviewer the subject is treated with perhaps a little of dogmatism. In fact the position of the book seems weakest in regard to its conception of logic. By basing logic on the theory of judgment, Dr. Rehmke would naturally tend to overlook the truth that there are certain implications, hardly derivable from the theory of judgment, which the philosopher's reasoning must obey. For example, do not relations and terms imply each other? Can the one be more fundamental than the other? Judging from his statements about "*Ort*" he would seem to regard *term* as more fundamental than relation (pp. 105–106); and his statements about quantity indicate the same view (pp. 105–106). Again, he claims to have eliminated the difficulty as to a thing being one while it changes, by his doctrine that the thing is itself the series of moments in time (see later); but surely he should at least have squared himself with Mr. Bradley's dictum that "to identify the diverse" is the essence of contradiction.

Things are differentiated by diversity in any or all of the three "Bestimmtheiten," quantity, form, and place. But a thing is more than a "Dingaugenblick"; it is a succession of them, "die Einheit von Dingaugenblicke im Nacheinander" (p. 148). A thing may then change without contradiction, since by definition it includes change. The old contradiction of a moving thing is answered thus: "Ein

einzigster Dingaugenblick also zeigt das Ding weder in Bewegung, noch auch, wie eben die Eleaten (s. den fliegenden ruhenden Pfeil) irrenderweise meinten, in Ruhe" (p. 187), for *rest* is a relation as well as motion. Two theses follow: all change is both loss and gain in quantity, form, and place (pp. 169 ff.), and no "secondary" qualities can be constitutive of a thing, for they have not "place": "zu der Empfindung als besonderem Gegebenen ein Ort nicht gehört" (p. 199). The doctrine is that things are primary qualities united in place.

The other groups (only two are found) of given facts, besides things, are conscious states. These are utterly different from things and irreducible. Philosophy finds them coördinate with the physical, and its relation to psychology is on a par with its relation to physics (p. 207). Place is quite lacking to the psychical; in fact, the two groups of "given" facts agree only in that both are given to consciousness. The ancient puzzle of the relation between body and mind now appears. The "double-aspect" theory splits on the rock of the ultimate difference between physical and psychical (p. 217). The author's solution is dualistic. Mind and body are two "givens" united into a working system ("Wirkenseinheit"), but they do not together constitute one individual. *That* assumption has caused all the trouble. The self, or uniting principle of mind is, as readers of the author's *Allgemeine Psychologie* will recall, the logical subject; that of the body is place. The two interact constantly. That this is possible is argued in a difficult discussion of causation (pp. 245-295) which defines that category as a three-term relation. "Das Wort 'Ursache und Wirkung' umfasst also nicht zwei, sondern *drei* Gegebene, und die Wirkenseinheit ist ein dreigliedrige Einheit" (pp. 255-256). The reviewer would repeat the criticism made above as to the neglect of logical implication. Is causation *intelligible* without a thread of identity between cause and effect? If not, the author's view of interaction would be illogical. But he is evidently a most thorough-going empiricist, for he does not seem to feel the constraint which many philosophers feel, of certain rationalising axioms. We recall a remark: "die Grundwissenschaft, unter deren 'Gegenständen' allerdings auch die Veränderung schlechtweg sich findet, eben mit dem Gegebenen schlechtweg zu tun hat, und, wie ihr demnach der Fragesatz 'wie ist Gegebenes überhaupt möglich?' ein leeres Gerede ist . . ." (pp. 190-191). Once admitting the intelligibility of interaction, however, we find progress easy. The will is the type of causation, though it does not act directly on the mind, but on the body. The real (inner or outer) is defined thus: "'Wirklich' ist ein Einzelwesen, das *wirk-*

oder Wirkung erfährt" (p. 300). It thus comprises physical and psychical alike but is only a part of the given.

The important result here seems to be that man is not simple but compounded. As conscious he is simple, as in-a-place he is simple; as twofold he acts upon, and is affected by, both the psychical and physical. "Eine stetige Wirkenseinheit von Leib und Seele ist also der Mensch. Dieser bedeutet nun aber nicht auch selbst wieder ein besonderes Einzelwesen . . ." (p. 306).

Returning to the physical world, we come to the question, are there simple ultimate things (atoms)? Ultimacy as a working unit must not be confused with indivisibility (p. 331). The question belongs to science (p. 350). Other questions considered are: Is the physical world (Dingwelt) one? Is anything imperishable? The former is answered in the negative, the latter in favor of the eternity (*in time*) of simple things. "Ewigkeit also kommt dem wirklich unteilbaren Dinge [atoms, if there are any] und dem Bewusstsein zu" (p. 420). And "ewig" here means "in jeder Zeit der Welt"—no timeless immortality for us!

Parts II and III must be merely outlined. The general thesis of Part II is that epistemology is no part of *Grundwissenschaft*, because it presupposes knowledge and its object (p. 438). Indeed it is a futile discipline, for it asks, how can the given be given? Still it might, if conceived as genetic psychology, be worthy of study. The difficulties of idealism, empiricism, rationalism, etc., would have been avoided if philosophers had not *separated*, but only *distinguished*, body and mind: "Liegen sie [epistemological schools] doch alle in demselben Spital krank an demselben Übel, nämlich an der irrigen Voraussetzung, dass Erkennendes und das Andere von einander Geschiedenes sei, ein Voraussetzung, die eben zu der toten Frage nach dem Gegebenen des Gegebenen führen muss" (p. 440). The theories are grouped under three heads: psychological (English empiricism), logical (earlier rationalism), and psychological-logical (Kantian rationalism). Rehmke's attitude toward the doctrine of a knowing subject behind all experience may be seen from these words: "Wer uns daher das Wort 'Erkenntnis subjekt' sagt und 'Nichtgegebenes' d. i. Nichts mit diesen Worte zum Ausdruck bringt, der lallt uns ein sinnloses Wort zu . . ." (p. 562). "Bin ich mir nun meiner selbst bewusst, so 'habe' oder 'besitze' ich auch mich, bin ich mir also, mit anderen Worten, selbst ein Gegebenes" (p. 562). His empiricism and anti-phenomenalism unite to form a realism.

The third part (pp. 582-700) emphasizes, among other things,

the author's realism, and shows him to a certain extent as an indeterminist. We gather some representative statements. "Es ist von der grössten Bedeutung, sich darüber klar zu werden, das, wenn wir von Ding und von Dingvorstellung reden, nicht Zweierlei, sondern *ein und dasselbe nur in zwei besonderen Betrachtungen zur Darstellung kommt*" (p. 611). "Wir legen aber sofort Einspruch ein gegen die Behauptung 'die Welt ist meine Vorstellung' wenn sie sagen will, 'die Welt gehört zu mir, der ich sie vorstelle, in dem Sinn, dass sie *abhängig* von mir, dem Vorstellenden, ist'" (p. 613). "Wir weisen diesen Traum einer Vorstellungs- und Erscheinungswelt vor allem auch aus dem Grunde ab, weil er gegen die Tatsache der Selbstunterscheidung des menschlichen Bewusstseins von dem Dinggegebenen offensichtlich verstösst, die deutlich lehrt, dass Dinggegebenes als solches nicht zum Bewusstsein gehört" (p. 616). Kant's epistemology is spoken of (p. 619 et passim) as "Dieser Erkenntnisroman Kants." "*Nichts, überhaupt nichts von allem Gegebenen ist als solches abhängig von dem besitzenden menschlichen Bewusstsein*" (p. 647), although indeed "Was für besondere Eigenschaften also das Ding als Besitz eines wahrnehmenden Bewusstseins zeige, das hängt ganz davon ab, was für ein besonderer Leib mit diesem Bewusstsein verknüpft ist" (p. 648). "Farbe, Ton, Härte usf. . . . von dem Leibe des Bewusstseins, dem es Gegebenes ist, abhängig ist" (p. 658). Some things or psychoses may not be effects, but only causes, for though causal connection is ubiquitous (p. 686) it does not always hold in both directions. There may then be freedom in the temporal, realistic sense. "Die Freiheit d. i. die Unabhängigkeit, deren sich das Bewusstsein als *wirkender* Wille bewusst ist, tritt . . . zu tage, weil dieses [Bewusstsein] als Wille eben niemals auch Wirkung erfährt und erfahren kann" (p. 700).

Altogether Professor Rehmke has produced a most important, though a long and difficult, treatise, which should be welcome to the modern realistic school.

W. H. SHELDON.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

Theories of Knowledge; Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism. By LESLIE J. WALKER. London, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910.—pp. xxxix, 696.

In the Preface to this volume written by Michael Maher, remark is made upon the large and increasing improvement manifest of recent years in Catholic philosophical literature both in English and foreign languages, and upon the constant appearance of new works which exhibit the genuine philosophical spirit. "A careful, patient and scru-